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Abstract 
The belief that studying mathematics improves reasoning skills, known as the 
Theory of Formal Discipline, has been held since the time of Plato. Research evidence 
supports this idea, at least in the context of students who had chosen to study post-
compulsory mathematics. Here we examined the development of reasoning skills in 
16- to 18-year-old Cypriot students, who are required to study mathematics until age 
18. One hundred and eighty eight students, studying high- or low-intensity 
mathematics, completed the abstract Conditional Inference Task and the contextual 
Belief Bias Syllogisms task at ages 16, 17 and 18. While the high-intensity group 
improved on the conditional inference task and showed a reduction in belief bias, the 
low-intensity group did not change on either measure. This is promising for the 
Theory of Formal Discipline, but suggests that a certain level of mathematical study 
may be necessary for students' general reasoning skills to develop. 
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Many philosophers, mathematicians, and policy-makers have claimed that 
studying mathematics improves reasoning skills. For example, John Locke stated that 
mathematics should be taught to “all those who have time and opportunity, not so 
much to make them mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures” 
(1706/1971, p.20), while Oakley (1949) suggested that “the study of mathematics 
cannot be replaced by any other activity that will train and develop man’s purely 
logical faculties to the same level of rationality”. These views reflect the Theory of 
Formal Discipline (TFD), which suggests that studying formal subjects, such as 
mathematics or Latin, improves thinking skills more broadly.  
Views about the veracity of the TFD may influence educational curricula. For 
example, Stanic (1986) and Stanic and Kilpatrick (1992) reported that changes to the 
US school-level mathematics curriculum in the twentieth century were related to 
views about the TFD in the mathematics education community. It is therefore 
important that views on the TFD are based on research evidence, which historically 
has been rather sparse. The aim of the current paper is to investigate the development 
of reasoning skills in 16- to 18-year-old mathematics students in Cyprus. Before 
describing the study in detail, we review the existing evidence on the relationship 
between mathematical study and improvements in reasoning skills. 
Lehman and Nisbett (1990) measured the conditional reasoning skills of US 
undergraduates in their first and fourth years of study. They found a correlation 
between the number of mathematics courses that natural science students had taken 
and the extent of improvement on their conditional reasoning task. Inglis and Simpson 
(2009) did not find any improvement in abstract conditional reasoning skills in 
English mathematics undergraduates, but the mathematics students did outperform 
arts students on their conditional reasoning task at the beginning of their university 
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studies. They argued that studying mathematics at A level (a non-compulsory 
qualification taken at the ages of 16-18 in England and Wales) may have been 
responsible for the initial difference between groups. This was supported by Attridge 
and Inglis (2013) who studied abstract conditional reasoning skills in mathematics 
and literature A level students, and found no difference between groups in reasoning 
behaviour at the start of post-compulsory education. While the literature students’ 
reasoning did not change during their first year of undergraduate studies, the 
mathematics students’ did. 
However, it should be noted that the change Attridge and Inglis (2013) 
observed was not quite as the TFD would predict. Proponents of the TFD suggest that 
mathematics teaches students to reason with ‘logic’, implying that their reasoning 
should become more normative. While the mathematics students did reason more in 
line with the normative model of the conditional over the year (the so-called 
‘material’ conditional), the change was better described as a move towards the 
‘defective’ conditional. Under the material interpretation of the conditional, ‘if p then 
q’ is true in all cases except where p is true and q is false. Under the defective 
interpretation of the conditional, the conditional is only relevant when p is true, so 
that the conditional is true when p and q are true, false when p and not-q are true, and 
irrelevant when p is false.  
The reason for the increase in conformity to the defective conditional, as 
Houston (2009) suggested, may be that many mathematical statements are of the form 
‘if statement A is true, then statement B is true’ (even if heavily disguised), and that A 
is assumed to be true (even if it is clearly not) and the truth or falsity of B is then 
deduced. Since the AS level curriculum does not include any explicit reference to 
conditional logic or the normative model of conditionals, it is plausible that exposure 
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to implicit ‘if then’ statements, where the antecedent is assumed to be true, could 
induce a defective interpretation of the conditional, where false antecedent cases are 
considered irrelevant. 
Despite its name, the defective conditional is considered to be psychologically 
sophisticated (Evans et al, 2007), and so the change could still be viewed as a positive 
development. In fact, Hoyles and Küchemann (2002) argued that the defective 
conditional is actually more appropriate for mathematics learning than the material 
conditional (which leads to normative responses) because students need to understand 
the consequences of an implication when the antecedent is taken to be true. On the 
other hand, Durand-Guerrier (2003) argued that a defective interpretation of the 
conditional hinders students from drawing the valid modus tollens (if p then q, not q, 
therefore not p) inference. Contrary to this, and in support of Hoyles and Küchemann, 
Inglis and Simpson (2009b) found that a group of undergraduate mathematics 
students tended to have a more defective than normative interpretation of 
conditionals, and that this did not in fact prevent them from drawing modus tollens 
inferences or from being successful in their university-level mathematics 
examinations. 
While Attridge and Inglis’s (2013) findings seemed to support the suggestion 
that studying mathematics develops at least one type of reasoning skill, the students in 
their sample had chosen to study mathematics at the post-compulsory level, 
suggesting that on the whole they enjoyed it or considered it important, and would 
likely have been engaged with it. If someone were compelled to study a reduced 
syllabus of mathematics, it is not necessarily the case that they would see the same 
benefits. Thus an important question is whether the compulsory study of mathematics 
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at a lower level than that found in the A level curriculum develops similar reasoning 
skills. 
In most educational jurisdictions it is already compulsory to study 
mathematics until the age of 18 (Hodgen, Pepper, Sturman & Ruddock, 2010; 
Hodgen, Marks & Pepper, 2013). In Cyprus, students have the option to study 
mathematics as a low- or high-intensity subject from the age of 16 to 18. This 
provides a good opportunity to see whether the changes found in the mathematics 
group in Attridge and Inglis’s (2013) study are also seen in groups who study a 
reduced mathematics syllabus, and who are studying mathematics as a requirement 
rather than as an option.  
Another important difference between our study and that by Attridge and 
Inglis (2013) is that the mathematics curricula in Cyprus at the 16-18 stage has a 
substantial logic (deductive geometry) component, whereas the English and Welsh 
curriculum does not. In fact, Attridge and Inglis could identify no explicit logic 
component to the English and Welsh A level curriculum. The Cypriot curriculum is 
discussed in more detail in the methods section.  
 
The study 
We aimed to investigate the development of reasoning skills in mathematics 
students when it is compulsory to study some level of mathematics and where there is 
an explicit logic component to the curriculum. We used a similar method to that of 
Attridge and Inglis (2013) but with a different manipulation – rather than comparing 
mathematics to non-mathematics students, we compared students studying high- or 
low-intensity mathematics. This allowed us to examine the effect of intensity of 
mathematics study on the development of reasoning skills, as opposed to the 
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presence/absence of mathematical study. In this sense our study can be seen as a 
conceptual replication and extension of Attridge and Inglis’s study.  
We tested Cypriot students at the beginning, middle and end of their two years 
of study beginning at age 16. We gave the students two reasoning tasks: the abstract 
conditional inference task used by Attridge and Inglis (2013) and Inglis and Simpson 
(2009), and a belief bias syllogisms task (Sá, West and Stanovich, 1999). The 
syllogisms task provided a measure of syllogistic reasoning and belief bias (the extent 
to which participants are influenced by the believability of conclusions rather than 
their logical validity) and was included to extend the breadth of the investigation into 
more contextualised reasoning. We compared high-intensity and low-intensity 
mathematics students’ changes in performance on the two tasks over the two years of 
study. 
We predicted that reasoning skills on both tasks would be improved to a 
greater extent in the high-intensity group than in the low-intensity group. If this were 
the case, it could be due to the higher level of mathematics studied, the greater 
intensity of mathematics study, or the presumably higher level of motivation to study 
mathematics given the choice to study it at the high intensity level. On the conditional 
task, due to a more formal style of deductive geometry in the Cypriot mathematics 
curriculum, we predicted that the change would be best characterised as an increase in 
the material interpretation of the conditional, as opposed to the defective 
interpretation found by Attridge and Inglis (2013). On the syllogisms task, we 
predicted that syllogisms scores would increase, while belief bias would decrease. A 
key issue is whether the low-intensity group would improve on any of the measures at 
all. If they did, it might suggest that electing to study mathematics is not essential for 
students to benefit from improved reasoning skills. 
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Method 
Design 
The study followed a longitudinal quasi-experimental design. Participants 
were recruited after they had chosen whether to study low-intensity or high-intensity 
mathematics, and were tested at the beginning of their penultimate academic year (at 
age 15 or 16), at the end of their penultimate year and again at the end of their final 
year. They completed the same tasks in each session.  
 
Participants 
Participants were 188 students (82 male, 106 female), aged 15-18 at Time 1 
(M=16.02, SD=0.42) recruited from a single school. The large-sized school (726 
students) was located in an urban area in a large town and had a mixed catchment area 
containing families of high, medium and low socioeconomic statuses. Seventy-four 
students were taking high-intensity mathematics and 114 were taking low-intensity 
mathematics. 
 
Mathematics syllabus 
Approximately 40% of students opt for high-intensity mathematics in the 
participants’ school, with the rest taking low-intensity mathematics. The low-intensity 
mathematics syllabus involves three 45-minute sessions per week in the first year and 
two in the second year. The high-intensity syllabus involves seven 45-minutes 
sessions per week in the first year and six in the second year. Of particular interest is 
the large Euclidean geometry component of the high-intensity syllabus. The school 
gave copies of Argyropoulos, Vlamos, Katsoulis, Markatis, and Sideris’s (2001) 
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textbook to all high-intensity students, and teachers were also encouraged to use other 
books they considered appropriate, such as Leptou and Loizou (1991), to meet the 
curriculum requirements. Argyropoulos et al.’s textbook was the subject of a detailed 
analysis by Mouzakitis (2006). He described the presentation as following a 
“traditional Euclidean deductive style, in which the definitions and the enunciations 
of theorems are not motivated but imposed upon the reader” (p. 15), and suggested 
that the textbook “emphasises tasks that require a formal proof of some mathematical 
fact” (p. 17). Formal proof is also present in the non-geometric sections of the high-
intensity curriculum. For instance, the 2014 Pancyprian examinations contained a 
question that asked candidates to define and explain the Mean Value Theorem.  
 
Measures 
All measures and instructions were translated from English to Greek by two 
independent translators, then compared and merged into a third version. 
Abstract Conditional Inference. Participants completed the abstract 
Conditional Inference Task (Evans, Clibbens & Rood’s, 1995). The full task, 
including instructions, is presented in Appendix A. Participants are asked to assess the 
validity of 32 inferences of four types: modus ponens (MP: if p then q, p, therefore q), 
denial of the antecedent (DA: if p then q, not p, therefore not q), affirmation of the 
consequent (AC: if p then q, q therefore p) and modus tollens (MT: if p then q, not q, 
therefore not p). The structure of the inference types is summarised in Table 1. In half 
of the items, negations in the minor premises were explicit (e.g. ‘if the letter is A then 
the number is 4, the number is not 4, therefore the letter is not A’) and in half the 
negations were implicit (e.g. ‘if the letter is A then the number is 4, the number is 8, 
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therefore the letter is not A’). The lexical content of the rules were generated 
randomly and the order of the problems was randomised for each participant.  
From participants’ responses we calculated two interpretation indices for each 
participant at each time point: a normative conditional index (NCI) and a defective 
conditional index (DCI). Each participant received a score on each index to represent 
the number of items they answered consistently with that model of the conditional 
(Attridge & Inglis, 2013). A person who responded completely normatively would 
endorse all MP and MT inferences and no DA or AC inferences, while a person 
conforming perfectly to the defective conditional would endorse all MP inferences 
and no DA, AC, or MT inferences. The normative and defective responses to each 
item are also presented in Appendix A. 
Thematic Syllogisms. The Belief Bias Syllogisms task (Sá, West & Stanovich, 
1999) was used as a measure of the ability to reason independently of prior beliefs. 
The original 24 items were split into two equivalent 12-item forms (Attridge, 2013) to 
minimise time demands and to allow us to give participants opposite forms at 
consecutive testing points. The order of forms was counterbalanced. Each form 
consisted of 12 contextual syllogisms. Four were congruent – the believability of the 
conclusion agreed with the logical validity of the syllogism (i.e. either the conclusion 
was believable and the syllogism valid, or it was unbelievable and the syllogism 
invalid) – four were incongruent (believable-invalid, unbelievable-valid), and four 
were neutral (the conclusions had no belief value), see Figure 2. Participants decided 
whether each syllogism was logically valid or not after being instructed to ignore their 
prior beliefs. Two measures were taken: a total score out of 12, indicating the extent 
to which participants responded normatively, and a Belief Bias Index (BBI). The BBI 
was calculated for each participant by subtracting the number of incongruent items 
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answered correctly from the number of congruent items answered correctly (Sá, West 
& Stanovich, 1999). The resulting score indicates the degree to which a person’s 
answers are swayed by believability or validity. The BBI could range from -4 to +4 
with positive scores indicating some degree of belief bias. 
Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM). To control for differences 
between groups in general intelligence, we included an 18 item subset of RAPM with 
a 15 minute time limit (Sá, West & Stanovich, 1999).  
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Participants completed the CRT (Figure 3), 
which prompts intuitive but incorrect responses that participants must inhibit in order 
to think through the correct responses. Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011) found the 
CRT to be a better predictor of rational responding to reasoning tasks than cognitive 
ability, executive functions, or the Actively Openminded Thinking scale. The CRT 
was included to control for between-groups differences in thinking disposition. The 
questions were randomly intermixed with three simple mathematical word problems 
of a similar length from the Woodcock-Johnson III Applied Problems subtest. This 
was intended to reduce recall of the ‘trick’ nature of the CRT questions at the second 
and third tests.  
Mathematics Manipulation Check. A 15-item mathematics test was included 
as a manipulation check (i.e. to see whether the high-intensity group learnt, as one 
would expect, more mathematics than the low-intensity group, Attridge and Inglis, 
2013). Twelve items were taken from the Woodcock-Johnson III Calculation subtest 
and three items were the most difficult items on the Loughborough University 
diagnostic test for incoming mathematics undergraduates in 2008 and 2009. The 
questions were selected to prevent floor and ceiling effects and were presented in a set 
order that was intended to be progressive. 
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Procedure 
Participants took part in class under examination-style conditions. The tasks 
were presented in a single paper booklet. Since the RAPM task had a time limit it was 
always completed first. The order of the subsequent tasks was counterbalanced 
between-participants following a Latin Square design and participants were instructed 
to work at their own pace until they had completed all tasks or until the class came to 
an end. The sessions lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
 
Results 
Data cleaning 
Of the 188 participants who took part at Time 1 (74 in the high-intensity group 
and 114 in the low-intensity group), 184 returned at Time 2 and 180 returned at Time 
3. However, not all participants completed all tasks at each time point: 107 (44 high-
intensity and 63 low-intensity) completed the conditional inference task at all three 
time points and were included in its analysis, and 124 (50 high-intensity and 74 low-
intensity) completed the syllogisms task at all three time points and were included in 
its analysis. Those who attended but did not complete tasks either missed them out or 
left them incomplete. 
To determine whether these incomplete responses were a threat to validity, we 
analysed the characteristics of the participants who completed each task at all three 
time points compared to those who did not. There were no differences between those 
who completed the conditional inference task at all three sessions and those who did 
not on: Time 1 Raven’s scores, F < 1, Time 1 CRT scores, F < 1, or Time 1 NCI 
scores, F < 1. Furthermore, there was no significant interaction between Group and 
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Completion (a factor which stated whether participants completed the conditional 
inference task or not) for Time 1 Ravens scores, F(1,204) = 2.11, p = .184, Time 1 
CRT scores, F < 1, or Time 1 NCI scores, F(1,146) = 2.28, p = .134.   
There were no differences between those who completed the belief bias 
syllogisms task at all three sessions and those who did not on Time 1 Raven’s scores, 
F(1,204) = 1.35, p = .246, Time 1 CRT scores, F < 1, Time 1 Syllogisms scores, 
F(1,162) = 1.13, p = .290, or Time 1 BBI scores, F < 1. Furthermore, there was no 
interaction between Group and Completion for Time 1 Ravens scores, F < 1, Time 1 
CRT scores, F < 1, Time 1 Syllogisms scores, F < 1, or Time 1 BBI scores, F < 1.  
Overall we found no evidence that there was systematic bias in the 
participants who did or did not complete the tasks, i.e. those students who missed out 
tasks at Time 2 or 3 were typical of the overall sample.  
 
Covariates 
Time 1 scores on Ravens and CRT were significantly positively correlated, 
r(148) = .287, p < .001, and the high-intensity students outperformed the low-
intensity students on the Ravens, t(186) = 5.24, p < .001, and CRT, t(146) = 2.58, p = 
.001, measures. To investigate changes in each group over time, Ravens and CRT 
scores were entered into separate 2 (Group: high-intensity, low-intensity) × 3 (Time: 
1, 2, 3) ANOVAs (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics).  
For Ravens scores, this revealed significant main effects of Time, F(2,326) = 
27.05, p < .001, np2 =  .142, and Group, F(1,163) = 41.72, p < .001, np2 = .204, but no 
significant interaction, F(2,326) = 1.26, p = .286, np2  = .004. Overall, scores were 
higher in the high-intensity group (M = 8.22, SD = 2.55) than in the low-intensity 
group (M = 5.61, SD = 2.55) and post hoc tests with Bonferroni correction showed 
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that scores increased between Time 1 (M = 6.03, SD = 2.14) and Time 2 (M = 7.27, 
SD = 2.36, p < .001), and between Time 1 and 3 (M = 7.44, SD = 2.64, p < .001) but 
not between Time 2 and 3 (p = 1.00). 
For CRT scores, there were significant main effects of Time F(2,202) = 18.06, 
p < .001, np2  = .152, and Group, F(1,101) = 11.42, p = .001, np2 = .102, but no 
significant interaction, F(2,202) =2.36, p = .097, np2 = .023. Overall, scores were 
higher in the high-intensity group (M = .78, SD = .70) than in the low-intensity group 
(M = .29, SD = .70) and post hoc tests with Bonferroni correction showed that scores 
increased between Time 1 (M = .33, SD = .63) and Time 2 (M = .60, SD = .86, p < 
.001), and between Time 1 and 3 (M= .68, SD = .90, p < .001) but not between Time 
2 and 3 (p = .565). 
In sum, for both Ravens and CRT scores, the high-intensity group scored 
higher than the low-intensity group, but there were no significant differences between 
groups in the extent of improvement over the two years of the study. 
Ravens scores at Time 1 were not correlated with change in NCI, DCI, 
syllogisms scores, or BBI scores between Time 1 and Time 3 (all ps > .27), so are not 
used as covariates in the analyses below. Similarly, CRT scores at Time 1 were not 
correlated with change in NCI, DCI, syllogisms scores, or BBI scores between Time 1 
and Time 3 (all ps > .18), so are also not used as covariates in the analyses below1. 
 
Manipulation check 
To investigate whether, as one would expect, the high-intensity students learnt 
more mathematics than the low-intensity students, mathematics scores were entered 
into a 2 (Group: high-intensity, low-intensity) × 3 (Time: session 1, session 2, session 
3) ANOVA. This showed significant main effects of Time, F(2,248) = 64.78, p < 
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.001, np2 = .343, and Group, F(1,124) = 105.03, p < .001, np2 = .459, and an 
interaction between Time and Group, F(2,248) = 40.96 p < .001, np2 = .248 (see 
Figure 4). The high-intensity mathematics students scored higher than the low-
intensity students on the mathematics test at Time 1, t(124) = 4.52, p < .001, d = .78, 
and scores increased over time in the high-intensity, F(2,106) = 51.11, p < .001, np2 = 
.491, and to a lesser extent in the low-intensity group, F(2,142) = 6.26, p = .021, np2 = 
.081. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni correction indicated that, in the high-intensity 
group, scores increased between Time 1 (M = 4.56, SD = 2.63) and Time 2 (M = 
6.74, SD = 2.92, p < .001), and between Time 2 and Time 3 (M = 8.33, SD = 3.19, p 
< .001). In the low-intensity group, scores increased between Time 1 (M = 2.92, SD = 
1.38) and Time 2 (M = 3.46, SD = 1.32, p = .005), and between Time 1 and Time 3 
(M = 3.32, SD = 1.26, p = .018), but not between Time 2 and Time 3 (p = 1.00). 
Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2.  
Overall this analysis suggests that both groups improved on the mathematics 
test across the two years of the study, with the high-intensity group improving to a 
greater extent than the low-intensity group, as expected. 
 
Changes in conditional reasoning behaviour 
At Time 1, there were no differences between groups in conformity to either 
the NCI or the DCI (both ps > .65). We first conducted a 2 (Index: NCI, DCI) × 2 
(Group: high-intensity, low-intensity) × 3 (Time: Session 1, Session 2, Session 3) 
ANOVA. There was a significant Time × Group interaction, F(2,210) = 3.953, p = 
.021, np2 = .036, suggesting that the two groups developed their conditional reasoning 
behaviour differently. There was no significant Index × Time × Group interaction, F 
< 1, suggesting that the divergence in development between groups was similar for 
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both NCI and DCI. To explore this in more detail we entered the two indices into 
separate 2 (Group: high-intensity, low-intensity) × 3 (Time: Session 1, Session 2, 
Session 3) ANOVAs.  
Scores on the NCI, which indexed the extent to which students responded in 
accordance with the normative material model of the conditional, are shown in Table 
2 and Figure 4. On the 2 × 3 ANOVA there was a significant main effect of Time, 
F(2,210) = 3.22, p = .042, np2 = .030, and an interaction between Time and Group, 
F(2,210) = 4.98, p = .008, np2 = .045. This interaction was due to a significant main 
effect of Time within the high-intensity group, F(2,86) = 6.93, p = .002, np2 = .139, 
but not within the low-intensity group, F < 1.  This was further investigated with 
paired sample t-tests within each group. The high-intensity group’s NCI scores 
marginally increased between Time 1 and Time 2, t(43) = 1.89, p = .066, d = .16, and 
between Time 2 and Time 3, t(43) = 1.97, p = .055, d = .65, and significantly 
increased between Time 1 and Time 3, t(43) = 3.49, p = .001, d = .69. The low-
intensity group’s scores did not change between any of the time points (all ps > .67, 
ds < .24). Although our three-way ANOVA found no significant Index × Time × 
Group interaction, when we conducted a Time × Group ANOVA on DCI scores, we 
found no main effects or interactions (all ps > .21, ds < .43), see Figure 4. Overall, our 
findings indicate that, although the two groups did not differ in their reasoning 
behaviour at Time 1, the high-intensity group reasoned more in line with the 
normative model over time, while the low-intensity group did not change. 
 
Changes in syllogistic reasoning 
Total syllogisms scores and BBI scores were entered into separate 2 (Group: 
high-intensity, low-intensity) × 3 (Time: Session 1, Session 2, Session 3) ANOVAs 
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(see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). For total syllogisms scores, there 
was a marginal effect of Group, F(1, 122) = 3.63, p = .059, np2 = .029, where the high-
intensity group scored higher (M = 7.05, SD = 1.22) than the low-intensity group (M 
= 6.62, SD = 1.22). There was no main effect of Time, F < 1, and no interaction 
between Time and Group, F < 1. 
For BBI scores, there was no main effect of Group, F < 1, but there was a 
main effect of Time, F(2,238) = 4.52, p = .012, np2 = .037. Post hoc tests with 
Bonferroni corrections indicated that scores did not change between Time 1 (M = 
1.55, SD = 1.63) and Time 2 (M = 1.59, SD = 1.56), p = 1.00, but that they decreased 
significantly between Time 2 and Time 3 (M = 1.14, SD = 1.51), p = .013, and 
decreased marginally between Time 1 and Time 3, p = .062. There was also an 
interaction between Time and Group, F(2,238) = 3.89, p = .022, np2 = .031, see Figure 
4. This was due to a significant effect of Time within the high-intensity group, 
F(2,140) = 6.17, p = .003, np2 =.112, but not the low-intensity group, F(2,140) = 1.49, 
p = .228, np2 =.021. In the high-intensity group, BBI scores did not change between 
Time 1 (M = 1.84, SD = 1.70) and Time 2 (M = 1.58, SD = 1.44, p = 1.00), but they 
significantly decreased between Time 2 and Time 3 (M = .98, SD = 1.27, p = .022), 
and between Time 1 and Time 3, p = .007. 
In summary, the high-intensity group scored slightly higher on the syllogisms 
task than the low-intensity group, but neither group improved over time. However, the 
high-intensity group did improve on a measure of belief bias, while the low-intensity 
group did not. In other words, across the two years of the study the high-intensity 
group became less influenced by the believability of the conclusions of the syllogisms 
they were asked to evaluate, whereas the low-intensity group did not change. 
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Discussion 
 
We investigated the development of abstract conditional reasoning skills and 
contextual syllogistic reasoning skills in 16- to 18-year old students studying high and 
low-intensity mathematics in a Cypriot school. While the high-intensity mathematics 
group improved on a measure of normative conditional reasoning, and decreased in 
belief bias, the low-intensity mathematics group did not. There were no differences 
between groups in improvement on the intelligence or thinking disposition measures. 
We see three potential explanations for the developmental differences we 
found between the groups. First, it could be due to the high-intensity group studying 
mathematics at a higher level than the low-intensity group. Second, it could be due to 
the greater number of hours that the high-intensity group spend studying mathematics. 
Third, it could be because the low-intensity group chose the low-intensity option 
because they were less interested and/or successful in mathematics than the group 
who chose high-intensity mathematics. Our results do not allow us to distinguish 
between these possibilities, and it is hard to imagine a curriculum where these factors 
could be distinguished. Testing these explanations would require an experiment in 
which students are randomly assigned to a high or low level of mathematics study and 
more or fewer hours of study per week, with their attitudes towards mathematics 
measured at the start. What our results do allow us to conclude is that in a system 
where some level of mathematics study is compulsory, not all students will benefit 
from improved reasoning skills.  
Our findings differ from those of Attridge and Inglis (2013) in terms of the 
nature of the students’ development. We found that the Cypriot high-intensity 
students’ change in conditional reasoning behaviour was better described by a change 
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in the direction of the normative model, whereas in England the change was in the 
direction of the sophisticated but non-normative defective conditional (Attridge & 
Inglis, 2013). This may be due to the difference in curricula between the two 
countries – in England there is no explicit logic component to the mathematics A 
level curriculum, while in Cyprus there is a substantial deductive geometry 
component at the equivalent stage. As noted in the methods section, the high-intensity 
students used a textbook that presented Euclidean geometry in the traditional 
definition-theorem-proof deductive style. This may account for the more normative 
change in conditional reasoning behaviour, and also the reduction in belief bias found 
in the Cypriot students.  
Our interpretation – that the difference in direction of development between 
the Cypriot high-intensity mathematics students and Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) 
mathematics students is due to the differences between the Cypriot and English 
curricula – is supported by the findings in both studies that there were no differences 
between groups at the start of the courses. This makes it unlikely that the differences 
between studies in the direction of development observed were due to the previous 
educational or cultural experiences of the students. 
One potential implication of these results relates to the suggestion that in 
England and Wales students should continue studying mathematics until the age of 
18. There are many reasons put forward in favour of such a policy change, and one of 
these is the suggestion that studying mathematics develops students’ abilities to 
reason logically (e.g. Smith, 2004; Vorderman, 2011). Our findings suggest that if it 
were made compulsory for English and Welsh students to study mathematics at the 16 
to 18 stage, then their reasoning skills may not improve in the same manner as 
students who have chosen to study mathematics at this stage. This suggestion rests on 
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our finding that the Cypriot low-intensity students did not develop on any reasoning 
measure across the two years of the study, along with the assumption that the low-
intensity mathematics students are in some sense equivalent to English non-
mathematics A level students (students who would opt out of mathematics in an 
optional system would presumably chose the low intensity option in a compulsory 
system), while the Cypriot high-intensity mathematics students, who did improve on 
the conditional reasoning measure, are in a sense equivalent to English mathematics A 
level students. However, other factors to consider are the level and intensity of 
mathematics studied. The low intensity students in Cyprus studied mathematics at a 
lower level and for fewer hours per week than the high intensity group. Perhaps if 
these students had been required to study the same mathematics as the high intensity 
group, they would have improved on the reasoning tasks. The implication is that if 
students are compelled to study a low level of mathematics post-16, then while their 
mathematics skills may improve their reasoning skills may not. 
A limitation to this study is that it was conducted in only one school, 
restricting the generalizability of the findings. It would be useful for future research to 
examine the development of reasoning skills in a more representative sample of 
schools in Cyprus, and other educational jurisdictions. This would also allow an 
examination of factors other than intensity that might influence the results, such as 
class size. Furthermore, a notable proportion of our sample did not fully complete all 
measures at all three time points. Although we found no evidence that there was any 
bias to the drop out, it is nevertheless undesirable and may have been biased on 
factors that we did not measure. 
There is now a growing body of evidence suggesting that studying 
mathematics is associated with improved abstract conditional reasoning skills 
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(Lehman & Nisbett, 1990; Attridge & Inglis, 2013; the current data). Furthermore it 
seems that different types of mathematics influence conditional reasoning skills in 
different ways. It would be fruitful for future research to investigate more 
systematically which areas of mathematics are associated with what type of change in 
reasoning behaviour (i.e. material conditional, defective conditional, belief bias, and 
more real-world reasoning). 
Proponents of the TFD believe that studying mathematics improves one’s 
reasoning skills in a useful way. But what relation do the tasks used in this and similar 
studies have to real-word reasoning activities (cf. Reid & Inglis, 2005)? Although it 
may seem that the skills required to successfully tackle the tasks used in research 
studies (i.e. formal, abstract, paper-based) are far removed from real-world thinking, 
several researchers have argued that this is not the case. Stanovich (2004), for 
instance, suggested that decontextualised reasoning of the type required to 
successfully complete the reasoning tasks used here is disproportionately important in 
post-industrial societies. He argued that “the argument that the laboratory tasks and 
tests are not like ‘real life’ is becoming less and less true. ‘Life’, in fact, is becoming 
more like the tests!” (p. 124). He supported his position with multiple examples of 
situations where abstract reasoning skills and following formalized rules are essential 
to succeed in modern life. For example, choosing a mortgage or insurance policy, 
determining whether you are eligible to claim benefits, arguing that a company has 
not fulfilled their contractual obligations and graduating from university.   
While it may be the case that we are not often required to deduce conclusions 
from abstract conditional statements, it may well be the case that the improvement 
found on such tasks is reflective of a more general improvement in decontextualised 
logical reasoning skills. Future research would benefit from investigating the effect of 
Reasoning development during post-16 mathematics 22 
studying mathematics on tasks that more closely resemble real world reasoning 
contexts, such as those included on the Adult Decision-Making Competence task 
battery, performance on which has been shown to correlate with a measure of real life 
decision-making outcomes (Bruine de Bruine, Parker & Fischhoff, 2007).  
To conclude, we have shown that studying high (but not low) intensity 
mathematics at the 16 to 18 stage of Cypriot education is associated with an 
improvement in conditional reasoning skills and a reduction in belief-based 
responding. This is a positive finding for proponents of the TFD and for mathematics 
educators in general. 
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Endnotes 
1. When including RAPM and CRT as covariates, the main effect of Time on NCI 
scores loses significance, as does the marginal effect of group on BBT scores, but 
the results are otherwise the same. 
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Appendix A 
The conditional inference task 
This section is concerned with people’s ability to reason logically with sentences in 
various forms. You will be presented with a total of 32 problems on the following 
pages. In each case you are given two statements together with a conclusion which 
may or may not follow from these statements.  
 
Your task in each case is to decide whether or not the conclusion necessarily follows 
from the statements. A conclusion is necessary if it must be true, given that the 
statements are true. 
 
Each problem concerns an imaginary letter-number pair and contains an initial 
statement or rule which determines which letters may be paired with which numbers. 
An example of a rule of similar form to those used would be: 
 
If the letter is B then the number is not 7. 
 
In each case you must assume that the rule holds and then combine it with the 
information given in the second statement. This will concern either the letter or the 
number of an imaginary pair, for example: 
 
The letter is Y. 
The number is not 4. 
 
If the information concerns the letter the conclusion will concern the number and 
vice-versa. 
 
A full problem looks something like: 
 
If the letter is X then the number is 1. 
The letter is X. 
Conclusion: The number is 1. 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
 
If you think the conclusion necessarily follows then please tick the YES box, 
otherwise tick the NO box. Please work through the problems in order and make sure 
you do not miss any. Do not return to a problem once you have finished and moved 
on to another. 
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Item Inference Normative Defective 
If the letter is A then the number is 3. 
The letter is A. 
The number is 3.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is T then the number is 5. 
The letter is not T. 
The number is not 5.  
 
DA No No 
If the letter is F then the number is 8. 
The number is 8. 
The letter is F.  
 
AC No No 
4. If the letter is D then the number is 4. 
The number is not 4. 
The letter is not D.  
 
MT Yes No 
If the letter is G then the number is not 6. 
The letter is G. 
The number is not 6.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is R then the number is not 1. 
The letter is not R. 
The number is 1.  
 
DA No No 
If the letter is K then the number is not 3. 
The number is not 3. 
The letter is K.  
 
AC No No 
If the letter is U then the number is not 9. 
The number is 9. 
The letter is not U.  
 
MT Yes No 
If the letter is not B then the number is 5. 
The letter is not B. 
The number is 5.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is not S then the number is 6. 
The letter is S. 
The number is not 6.  
 
DA No No 
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If the letter is not V then the number is 8. 
The number is 8. 
The letter is not V.  
 
AC No No 
If the letter is not H then the number is 1. 
The number is not 1. 
The letter is H.  
 
MT Yes No 
If the letter is not F then the number is not 3. 
The letter is not F. 
The number is not 3.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is not L then the number is not 9. 
The letter is L. 
The number is 9.  
 
DA No No 
If the letter is not J then the number is not 8. 
The number is not 8. 
The letter is not J.  
 
AC No No 
If the letter is not V then the number is not 7. 
The number is 7. 
The letter is V.  
 
MT Yes No 
If the letter is D then the number is 2. 
The letter is D. 
The number is 2.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is Q then the number is 1. 
The letter is K. 
The number is not 1.  
 
DA No No 
If the letter is M then the number is 4. 
The number is 4. 
The letter is M.  
 
AC No No 
If the letter is V then the number is 5. 
The number is 2. 
The letter is not V.  
 
MT Yes No 
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If the letter is S then the number is not 8. 
The letter is S. 
The number is not 8.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is B then the number is not 3. 
The letter is H. 
The number is 3.  
 
DA No No 
If the letter is J then the number is not 2. 
The number is 7. 
The letter is J.  
 
AC No No 
If the letter is U then the number is not 7. 
The number is 7. 
The letter is not U.  
 
MT Yes No 
If the letter is not E then the number is 2. 
The letter is R. 
The number is 2.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is not A then the number is 6. 
The letter is A. 
The number is not 6.  
 
DA No No 
If the letter is not C then the number is 9. 
The number is 9. 
Conclusion: The letter is not C.  
 
AC No No 
If the letter is not N then the number is 3. 
The number is 5. 
The letter is N.  
 
MT Yes No 
If the letter is not A then the number is not 1. 
The letter is N. 
The number is not 1.  
 
MP Yes Yes 
If the letter is not C then the number is not 2. 
The letter is C. 
The number is 2.  
 
DA No No 
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If the letter is not W then the number is not 8. 
The number is 3. 
The letter is not W.  
 
AC No No 
If the letter is not K then the number is not 1. 
The number is 1. 
The letter is K.  
 
MT Yes No 
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Table 1. The four inferences (modus ponens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of 
the consequent and modus tollens) with and without negated premises (Prem) and 
conclusions (Con).  
 
 MP DA AC MT 
Prem Con Prem Con Prem Con Prem Con 
if p then q p q not-p not-q q p not-q not-p 
if p then not-q p not-q not-p q not-q p q not-p 
if not-p then q not-p q p not-q q not-p not-q p 
if not-p then not-q not-p not-q p q not-q not-p q p 
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Table 2. Mean scores on each task in each group at the three time points, with 
standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Task Group Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
RAPM 
High 6.81 (2.42) 8.11 (3.20) 8.02 (2.95) 
Low 5.09 (3.01) 5.84 (3.10) 6.43 (3.42) 
CRT 
High .50 (.81) .86 (.96) .97 (.97) 
Low .16 (.45) .33 (.75) .39 (.80) 
Mathematics 
High 4.56 (2.63) 6.74 (2.92) 8.33 (3.19) 
Low 2.92 (1.38) 3.46 (1.32) 3.32 (1.27) 
NCI 
High 15.57 (2.37) 16.43 (2.40) 17.32 (2.73) 
Low 16.06 (2.03) 15.94 (2.69) 15.87 (2.01) 
DCI 
High 13.43 (3.63) 13.48 (4.04) 14.45 (4.36) 
Low 13.71 (4.42) 12.63 (4.79) 12.98 (4.39) 
Syllogisms 
High 7.04 (1.32) 7.08 (1.59) 7.02 (1.88) 
Low 6.62 (1.69) 6.55 (1.74) 6.69 (1.34) 
BBI 
High 1.84 (1.70) 1.58 (1.44) .98 (1.27) 
Low 1.25 (1.53) 1.59 (1.61) 1.30 (1.62) 
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Figure 1. Example items from the Conditional Inference task, a) Modus Tollens and 
b) Denial of the Antecedent. 
 
If the letter is S then the number is 6  If the letter is M then the number is 4 
The number is not 6    The letter is not M 
Conclusion: The letter is not S  Conclusion: The number is not 4 
a) Modus Tollens   b) Denial of the antecedent 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of each item type from the Belief Bias Syllogisms task. 
 
Believable valid:    Believable invalid: 
All fish can swim    All living things need water 
Tuna are fish     Roses need water 
Tuna can swim    Roses are living things 
 
Unbelievable valid:    Unbelievable invalid: 
All things with four legs are dangerous All guns are dangerous 
Poodles are not dangerous   Rattlesnakes are dangeours 
Poodles do not have four legs   Rattlesnakes are guns 
 
Neutral valid:     Neutral invalid: 
All ramadions taste delicious   All lapitars wear clothes 
Gumthorps taste delicious   Podips wear clothes 
Gumthorps taste delicious   Podips are lapitars 
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Figure 3. The three-item Cognitive Reflection Task. 
 
1. A bat and a ball costs €1.10 in total. The bat costs €1 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
3. In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for 
the patch to cover half of the lake? 
 
Intuitive answers: Q1 = 10 cents, Q2 = 100 minutes, Q3 = 24 days. 
Correct answers: Q1 = 5 cents, Q2 = 5 minutes, Q3 = 47 days. 
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Figure 4. Changes in scores on the Conditional Inference. Belief Bias, and 
mathematics measures in each group over time. Error bars represent ±1 standard error 
of the mean. 
 
